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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mêt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, I. Abtl.: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*.—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Mr. Bradley's Doctrine of Knowledge. E. H. STRANGE. *Mind*, No. 80, pp. 457-488.

The basis of Mr. Bradley's theory of knowledge is the given fact of feeling. It is in feeling alone that reality is encountered, not in the objects of perception or of reflective thought. There are two main reasons for this: (1) feeling is a datum temporally prior to everything else in experience, prior even, to the self; (2) the question of knowledge is looked at from the point of view of the psychologist. The first combines the *tabula rasa* theory with the subjectivity of the Kantian theory of knowledge, while the latter assumes that the mind of the subject of investigation is a thing to be explained by time, space, and causality alone. But the activities of the self are not exhausted in the subjective and the momentary. They are directed outwards, and have relations which are theoretical, practical, emotional, and permanent. Mr. Bradley's "whole of feeling" is an unwarrantable psychological assumption which invalidates the necessary distinction involved in all knowing. The position collapses as an explanation of the self and of self-consciousness. If every object of perception is lost in the "whole of feeling," or has its roots for existence in the "whole of feeling," material things are mere psychical existences, and the distinction of subject and object vanishes. Similarly, if any definite 'thing' short of the Absolute is mere content, divorced from existence, mere ideal construction;—if, in other words, the basis of thought and judgment is the original "whole of feeling" which is psychical and identified with the individual, there can be no such thing as objective reality at all except the Absolute, and experience as we know it is a fiction. Moreover, if the objects of reflective thought are ideal constructions, then thought is an abstraction from a concrete whole, or the Absolute, with which it can never be identified. This makes the mental factor in any concrete situation to be the whole of the situation, which leads at once to agnosticism, and puts reality as much beyond finite thought as

does the Kantian thing-in-itself. But reality is not beyond the objects of finite thought, which, if true, *is* reality; if not true, reality is not separated by a great gulf from the object of finite thought, but continuous with, although more comprehensive and harmonious than, the object.

MARK E. PENNEY.

Negation Considered as a Statement of Difference in Identity. AUGUSTA KLEIN. Mind, No. 80, pp. 521-529.

Predication for Hegel and the Hegelians was a statement of identity in difference. Negative predication was not considered by them, and although negation is by no means on the same level with affirmation, no doctrine of Predicables is complete that does not present a negative, as well as an affirmative scheme of predications. This is the defect of the Hegelian identity in difference and of Sigwart's logic. The statement of negation as difference in difference is equally defective. The only adequate statement of negative predication must be *Difference in Identity*. This position rests upon the distinction between statement and implication. In negative predication the *difference-copula* states a difference and implies an identity, but the implication is so prominent as to make the affirmative proposition apparent, while in the affirmative statement the implication is so weak that the negative is generally lost sight of. Our schemes of affirmative predication, therefore, need revision, not from the standpoint of formal symmetry, but for the sake of limiting, and so completing, a term's intension.

MARK E. PENNEY.

Some Modern Advances in Logic. PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN. Monist, XXI, 4, 564-566.

Mathematics is traditionally supposed to be occupied with questions about number and quantity. Euclid did not reckon among his axioms the fundamental ideas of logic itself. Peano developed a system of symbols for logical propositions. Russell has carried on this work. Mathematics and logic seem to form part of a continuous whole. It now appears that the essential character of mathematical propositions is not as Euclid would have it—"A is true, therefore B is true," but "if A is true then B is true." The first volume of the *Principia Mathematica*, by Messrs. Russell and Whitehead, is written mostly in Peano's symbolism, and expounds the modern views on logic and mathematics.

M. W. PAXTON.

The New Realism and the Old. W. P. MONTAGUE. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., IX, 2, pp. 36-46.

Epistemology has two aspects, structural and functional. The criterion of truth is functional. The structural problem is that of the relation between knower and known. In this last mentioned problem is developed the question of naïve realism, dualistic realism, and subjectivism. Naïve realism, the

oldest of these, conceives of objects as directly presented to consciousness and being precisely what they appear to be. Later the soul is set against the phenomenal world. Descartes and Locke conceive the mental states as representations of the external world. Then, subjectivism says there can be no object without a subject. The issue between realism and subjectivism does not arise from a psycho-centric predicament, a difficulty of conceiving known things apart from my knowing them; but rather from the "ego-centric predicament"—the difficulty of conceiving known things apart from my knowing them. Hume attacked the spiritual substance of Berkeley but later clouded the issue.

If the absolute is known by its own fragments, each fragmentary self must assume that its own experience constitutes the Universe—which is solipsism. If independent reality is set up for the absolute it is relegated to the externality of the dualistic realist. The difficulty results from making knowledge an internal relation and hence constitutive of its object. This new realism lumps all subjectivists together and is itself almost identical with naïve realism.

M. W. PAXTON.

Richard v. Schubert-Solderns erkenntnistheoretischer Solipsismus. REGINE ETTINGER-REICHMANN. Ar. f. g. Ph., XVIII, 1, pp. 69-98.

The thorough-going subjective idealism of Richard von Schubert-Soldern is a reflex of the economic individualism of the present age. Designating his position as epistemological solipsism or empirical idealism, Schubert-Soldern asserts that sensations give us the only reality, and that all metaphysics which affirms a reality existing beyond consciousness must be discarded. On this view, philosophy, whose function it is to analyse the immediately given into its constituents, is held to contain the elements common to all the particular sciences. Scientific epistemology, according to Schubert-Soldern, must take the standpoint of immanence and abstain from all previously formulated hypotheses in its analysis of the given. Time, space and difference constitute the subjective connection of the given world. Within the totality of consciousness we may isolate the ego from the non-ego, the physical body from its environment. Such abstraction reveals the fact that perceptions and ideas belong to two different causal series which do not affect each other except in a mediate way, through the body. In criticism we may say that Schubert-Soldern, in holding that the separation of subject and object is artificial, is really starting out, not with an original fact but with an interpretation of reflective thought. This point of departure is, in fact, quite foreign to ordinary ways of thinking and sets at naught the distinction between psychology and natural science. True, in a psychological sense, we start out with the immediately given, but we cannot admit that the data of consciousness give us the only reality and never lead beyond themselves. The refusal on the part of Schubert-Soldern to recognize existence beyond the consciousness of the ego, leads him into inextricable difficulties in his treatment of objective time and space, an external world, and other egos. On the

other hand, were he to remain true to his assertion that perceptions alone give us the real, he could not logically recognise the regularity of nature.

J. R. TUTTLE.

La forme moderne du problème des universaux. CH. DUNAN. Rev. de Mét., XIX, 5, pp. 699-722.

Modern science is not interested in origins and essences, but only in laws and connections. This limitation of interest springs from the practical motive at the root of modern scientific investigation which is concerned merely to produce things through a calculation of laws, not to penetrate into the meaning of things. But if laws, which are simply common characters in things, are to be retained, so should essences; for essences are the laws which command as contrasted with the laws that describe; they are the ideals immanent in particular phenomena, to which those phenomena increasingly conform. Although metaphysics posits the essences, and leaves to science the task of developing their meaning, a certain kind of knowledge of essences is none the less possible. They cannot be represented by the imagination, but can be intellectually apprehended by the thought that creates them. Moreover, the positing of higher and better objects by thought is made possible by the progressive explanation of the meaning of objects by the scientific understanding. The process of scientific explanation culminates in the activity of thought, just as the infinite multiplicity of being culminates in pure and perfect unity. This Aristotelian view of essence, while transcending the abstractness of Nominalism, of Realism, and of Conceptualism, yet absorbs the truth asserted by each of these views. Nominalism is right in asserting that only particular being in the strict sense exists; Realism is right in asserting the essential nature of particular being to consist in the intelligible ideal there to a certain extent phenomenally embodied; Conceptualism is right in ascribing the apprehension of essential natures to the activity of thought.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

Do Things Exist? JOHN E. BOODIN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., IX, 1, pp. 5-14.

To early philosophy, individuality belongs to things; minds were part of a universal principle. Philosophy to-day has reversed its attitude; minds are more easily granted individuality. Several motives are at the bottom in denying individuality to things. One is a mystical temperamental bias which seeks for reality in haziness rather than in distinctions. Others are conceptual difficulties such as the difficulty of conceiving interaction between plural things, etc. Another and more serious objection against the reality of things has been raised from the Herakleitian viewpoint, so ably championed by Bergson. But while we must recognize novelty and interpenetration as facts of our experience, we must recognize a certain amount of constancy. The constancy of our symbols must correspond to constancy of reality or they

are of no value. Things must be granted individuality and existence outside of our perception, though they may consist of many interpenetrating impulses all travelling at diverse paces. Individuality is difficult to define. Though things for experience have a 'relational' background, they must be accorded an individual history, a particular pattern of parts which our own ideas must copy sufficiently for identification and prediction. Boodin prefers the instrumental way of looking at the 'thing,' because unlike the 'self' the 'thing' has no meaning or value that we can share with it. This pragmatic way of taking 'things' involves persistent identity, subjective and objective, and social agreement.

HENRY MAYER.

L'Intuition Philosophique. H. BERGSON. Rev. de Mét., XIX, 6, pp. 809-827.

At the basis of every philosophical system is an intuition, simple and spontaneous, which is realizable only through the images which place it forcibly before the philosopher and enable him to deny that which is contrary to it, whether in the developments of his own philosophy or in the thought of others. Though this intuition expresses itself in forms common to the age, and so it is possible to pick out the source of a system, and though its conceptual development leads to an apparently organic connection of the parts of the system, neither of these is the real philosophy; that is, the primary intuition itself. For example, we may show that, in the case of Berkeley, his fundamental postulates, idealism, nominalism, spiritualism, and theism, are derived from Duns Scotus, Malebranche, theology; or we may show how any one of these, as idealism, makes necessary certain others, and so show the interconnection of his system as an organic unity: but when we do so, we do violence to his philosophy, as this consists in the intuition at the base of all this development. The real secret of Berkeley's philosophy is rather to be learned from two images which strive to express his intuition; (1) the idea of matter as a *transparent film* between man and God which becomes clouded by the terms used to explain it, (2) the idea of matter as a divine visual language. This intuition expresses itself conceptually in the form prepared for it by the time in which it was seeking expression. In the same way the philosophical intuition is related to the science of its time, and is not, as some think, a synthesis of sciences which completes and fulfils them, carrying them beyond the point which they can attain of themselves. This, in so far as it is possible, is not philosophy but science, and is analysis rather than synthesis. Philosophy has rather to do with pure duration than with the pulverized time of science and common life; and if this attitude should be brought near to life and made common, there would result a great moral and æsthetic quickening of the individual life.

F. R. PROUT.

Positivisme et Pragmatisme, Criticisme et Pragmatisme. L. DAURIAC. Rev. Ph., XXXVI, 12, pp. 584-605.

Auguste Comte's conception of science is as dogmatically religious as any papal idea of religion; the scientific truth arrived at in the evolution of truth is absolute and, once attained, can not suffer any change, though further elaboration may take place. This conception admits of no scepticism, of no probabilism, it is *rationalism*, and as such, must be carried to its full conclusion. It would appear that this is far enough from pragmatism. But now this conception receives its climax in the science of sociology and the pragmatic movement is a result of sociology; even in the case of Comte himself this took place. He saw from his social study that (1) there is no society without religion, (2) religion needs dogma, (3) it is fetishism which results in dogma; accordingly, with these things in mind, he set about forming a religion. The fact that religion requires love, and this a disciplined love, led him to form the idea of the Great Being; is it not then a truly pragmatic idea and based on practical value? In the letters to Clotilde de Vaux we see the same spirit at work; for these recognize that prayer has a value for the one who prays although all thought of an actual hearer of the prayer be absent. James tells us that by watching the conduct of a person we may see the results and the truth of his religion; the ideas are fundamentally the same. Comte then seems to have foreshadowed the tendencies of his successors in all lines (a) empiricism, (b) rationalism, (c) pragmatism; between these elements he made no choice. It would be generally admitted that Kant is the father of *criticism*, but would one as readily admit him for the father of pragmatism? Yet we might give a very good case for this second idea, and might base this, not merely on the *Postulates of the Practical Reason*, obviously pragmatic, but on the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself, wherein the mind moulds reality in accord with its necessities; but in that there is an unknown world, we see the rationalism appear beside the pragmatic phenomenalism. We must now consider the *criticism* of the present day, and this in the work of Renouvier. In the *Premier Essai de Critique générale*, we see the rationalistic spirit working to list the categories and analyze perception; but when he later treats of Spencer and of J. S. Mill he evidences an empirical spirit; nor is this all, for in the *Deuxième Essai de Critique générale*, the foundation is the theory of mental vertigo, an analogy with physical vertigo, and this means simply that the idea works. It is still too early to speak historically of the position of Renouvier but we can see that in him there is a dilemma between rationalism and pragmatism.

F. R. PROUT.

Defective Logic in the Discussion of Religious Experience. MARY WHITON CALKINS. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VIII, 22, pp. 606-608.

Ames argues that religion is social in origin and nature, and concludes (1) that it is merely the highest type of social experience, and (2) that it does not consist in relation to a personal God or gods. The first position, however, is

too vague to criticize, and the second is based on the assumption that, if primitive man has no definite conception of a personal God, that conception plays no part in his religious consciousness. This argument is valid, however, only against intellectualistic forms of personalism.

A. H. JONES.

Reflections of a Temporalist on the New Realism. ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VIII, 22, pp. 589-599.

The new realism is new in that it attempts to combine two positions which have heretofore been regarded as antithetical—epistemological monism and realism. It seeks to do this by maintaining (1) that relations presuppose, and do not constitute, the existence of the objects related, and (2) that consciousness is not a substance or thing, but a particular kind of relation between known objects. The first position seems to prove the realistic existence of objects, and the second the monistic character of knowledge. These two propositions, in fact, constitute the major and minor premises of the new realism. The realist's theory of consciousness (to consider only the minor premise of the theory) is at fault, however, in that it does not allow for subjectivism and error. Maintaining that all the facts of experience, as real objects and real relations, stand on the same plane of objectivity, it cannot account for these aspects of experience; or if it explains them, it can only do so by passing from a relational to some form of dualistic epistemology.

A. H. JONES.

Der kategorische Imperativ gegenüber einer Wahrheit von Sittengesetzen. DR. BODEN. Ar. f. G. Ph., XVIII, i, pp. 7-53.

Is it not possible to retain a formal first principle, essentially similar to Kant's categorical imperative, along with a plurality of particular material principles? The particular principles of ethics would not be derived from, but rendered consistent with, this formal principle. Kant really makes use of two ultimate principles, the good will and the categorical imperative, corresponding, respectively, to feeling and to reason. A mediation between the two may be attained by our recognition that the feelings and impulses constitute a unity which reason regards in a purely formal view without attempting to give norms to the will. In the present discussion we may leave out of consideration that type of ethics which treats of the individual will as solely directed to the satisfaction of its own inclinations, for in strict logic, this theory must treat all volition as of equal or indifferent ethical worth. We must rather consider value-ethics, which places an evaluation upon volition according to some objective standard external to the inclinations of the individual. But the types of value-ethics are various and we also have many standards of customary morality, varying with the character of the group or sub-group. Hence we need a test of all those qualities which conduce toward a following of every valid customary law. This measure must be independent of any particular customary law and must therefore stand in

some sort of relation to the categorical imperative. Every particular moral law is the expression of a definite social organization and the social group or totality must count upon and make use of the impulses of individuals in a planful way. It must make use of their desires for esteem, for power, and for gain. Beyond this, the interest of the individual in the social group may rest on the impulse for an ordering of life according to reason, an impulse which is closely allied to the concept, and which is active in the sphere which Kant assigns purely to the reason. The group must foster in its component individuals a planful choice between, and organization of, their impulses. He who directly follows his momentary impulses is useless for the purposes of the group. Now every impulse is one-sided. Not even sympathy or the sense for order will suffice as a basis for all ethical action. Therefore, no single impulse may be regarded as of absolute ethical worth. If the impulses taken together contain the goal for man, it is the reason which furnishes the means for its attainment. While the impulses are manifold, the method of the reason is unitary. The capacity for rational thinking varies in different individuals and he who possesses in the highest degree the faculty of clear and resourceful thinking and for organizing his impulses, is best able to conform his conduct to every valid ethical law and is most fit to be a member of a social group. This necessary organization of the impulses is nothing more nor less than will. The general view here maintained is opposed to the denial on the part of Kant and Christian Ethics that the truly ethical is in any way dependent on rewards and punishments. Rewards and punishments are socially indispensable and an intelligent appreciation of their meaning and conformance of action thereto is distinctly ethical and conducive to social stability. On this view, the criterion of the ethical is the degree of rationality which agents or actions manifest. In the conflict of the ethical ideals of different social groups, he who best grasps the idea of the whole will be best able to decide complicated cases. Again, since new ethical norms trace back to reason, those individuals may be rated as of higher ethical worth who are able to originate higher and more far-reaching standards. Withal, we can only claim universal validity for the categorical imperative if we have it purely in the conceptual realm and do not attempt to derive from it any material norms. The present standpoint permits the most extreme ethical relativism to be reconciled with a general principle closely connected with Kant's categorical imperative. While not giving particular guidance, this principle will hold forth the ideal of an ethical toleration thoroughly rationalized by full and clear concepts. The chief means of the social organization to render this principle effective is an education in the deeper purposes of the group.

J. R. TUTTLE.

Mind and Body. J. S. MACKENZIE. *Mind*, No. 80, pp. 489-506.

Descartes and his immediate successors regarded the mind as a receptacle for ideas. From this it was only a short step to the conclusion, not only of Berkeley, that the whole material system, so far as we know it, is in our minds;

but to that of Leibniz, that everything is in our minds, including even the minds themselves. Malebranche made an advance upon this by his theory of the vision of all things in God, and not in our minds, using the term God to mean the Universe. Thus, two distinct conceptions of mind must be recognized: (1) that of the psychologist, for whom the mind consists of conscious states and processes. Bodies for such a mind would be other conscious states, physical bodies, geometrical figures, etc., and the relation sustained by the mind as conscious states to bodies of this kind would be simply the fact of awareness. This awareness can be explained only upon the possibility of qualitative transformations of motion. If the Conservation of Energy be always stated in quantitative terms, Huxley was not far astray in regarding consciousness as an epiphenomenon. Objections to qualitative changes can be urged with equal cogency against quantitative, and it is only upon the admission of the former that the relation between conscious states and bodies can be explained. (2) Mind is something to which all other things refer. This presupposes a Universe, in which the many are related in one Idealistic whole. This Universe must be interpreted as a system in which purpose, choice, and goodness have a place, and not one which is determined by the more materialistic conceptions.

MARK E. PENNEY.

Freud et le problème des rêves. N. KOSTYLEFF. Rev. Ph., XXXVI, 11, pp. 491-522.

In his interpretation of dreams Freud recognizes four principal moments in the foundation of a dream: (1) the condensation of the psychic data; (2) the change in their value for the individual; (3) the change of their form in the sense of plastic representation; (4) the secondary recomposition. The determining factor in the fusion of these moments is a secret desire. The desire is more or less strong through the day, and at night manifests itself in the form of a dream. Freud has established the fact that most of the dreams of children correspond to this conception, while those of adults correspond to an organic need, or to an immediate desire. With adults the mental life is too complex for a desire to be able to pass directly into a dream. With them the desires generally date farther back, present themselves under a disguised form, and necessitate some organic reinforcement to convert them into a dream. This reinforcement, according to Freud, can be nothing but an infantile desire, of the same nature, preserved in the realm of the unconscious. These unconscious desires may be considered as remaining always active, always ready to manifest themselves and to transmit their intensity to new impressions. Dreams of terror, Freud considers as having a sexual origin: in children, as the result of the first awakening of the sex instinct, and in adults, as the consequence of some alteration in it. The materials of Freud are very interesting, and his interpretations very suggestive, but he goes too far. Observation alone is not enough to explain such complex phenomena. It is not enough to affirm here a condensation, there a change of value, elsewhere an

intervention of the ego in the psychic data. To explain the results, they must be traced back to some general law of being, and connected with some psychic or mental faculty of the organism. From the point of view of objective psychology, the very irregular work of Freud takes on a significance which nullifies all the judgments passed upon it up to the present time. Among the faults to be criticised are the conclusion that all dreams may be traced back to the repression of a desire, and the arbitrary nature of a mass of conclusions which result from the analysis of particular cases. These faults are effaced, however, by the importance of the capital fact which was recognized by him: the process of sensorial repression. This finds a physiological basis, in the functioning of reflexes, which responds to all varieties of dreams. The reinforcements which the reflexes receive in the brain explain all the constellations of the latter. The accessory hypothesis of desire, and the arbitrary conclusions attached to it, fall of themselves; but the fact of having recognized this phenomenon by means of internal observation remains the incontestable merit of Freud.

ALMA R. THORNE.

Le problème sociologique et le problème philosophique. E. DE ROBERTY. Rev. Ph., XXXVI, 11, 449-490.

To produce concepts is the supreme end of all true society. *Abstraction* and *social conservation* are strictly synonymous. Abstraction is the *imum fundamentum* of the social order. It is developed, however, with extreme slowness and much vacillation. What we call laws are merely the apparently invariable relations between our concepts and things. According to the quality of the concepts which they unite, these laws are either empirical or theoretical. In sociology, as well as in philosophy, there is no lack of concepts, but they have not yet passed the empirical stage of development. The sociological problem has become the most pressing of all the problems of today, and the constitution of sociology necessarily carries with it a radical revolution in the conception of the end and the methods of philosophical labors. The social phenomenon *par excellence* is knowledge. Sociology is a theory or analysis of knowledge, of religious, philosophical, and æsthetic concepts, and of human conduct. Since Comte, as before him, the sociological concepts remain, at bottom, empirical. We have not yet rectified the vague and fleeting ideas of good and evil; of virtue and vice; of liberty, equality, and justice; of progress, power, and crime, etc., which sum up the social experience of past centuries and form the present stock of our present sociological wealth. The prime quality of this social *savoir*, or universal science, was metaphysics. Today metaphysics seems to have fallen into decay because the progressive emancipation of physical, chemical, and biological science has made it merely a lining to sociology. Philosophy, in its metaphysical phase, has been confused with the initial and empirical *savoir*. It has been the substitute for sociology and for theology, but there is a profound difference between philosophy and science. Science is analysis. The truly synthetic or philosophical thought works with

the partial generalizations due to analysis, and the concepts which it forms in its turn are worth no more and no less than the data which it utilizes. Sociology is an analysis of concepts. Synthetic thought is as old as the analytic thought from which it results. The philosophical problem is as old as civilization, but in our time it is confronted with indifference and distrust in the *élite*, learned; and, if from time to time there seems to be a partial revival of interest, it is quickly discovered that old systems, long dead and forgotten, have been temporarily galvanized into life. Those who would replace philosophy with science meet another difficulty. In sacrificing the necessarily monistic synthesis of the universe to the necessarily fractional analysis of nature, they are subject to the reproach of having impoverished humanity on the side of philosophy without having enriched it on the side of science. Modern philosophy is scarcely more than a vague study of certain social phenomena—theories of knowledge, æsthetics, morality, and conduct—a sociology which has not even the courage which philosophy formerly possessed of representing itself as the microcosm, the synthetic reduction of the universe. If the sociology of the savants has already posited its problems, the sociology of the philosophers appears to be the principal obstacle to its solution. Never, in the course of history, has philosophy found itself in so grave a situation. Behind it extends a glorious past, though encumbered with dead things; and before it stretches an avenue full of superb promises, but demanding a radical renovation of the principal methods of synthetic thought. In the philosophical crisis, which has the significance of a crisis in the increase of all modern culture it is sociology which plays the truly decisive rôle. The problem of philosophy is intimately joined with the problem of sociology, and the simultaneous solution of these two great questions depends upon the progress made in the theory of knowledge when finally transplanted from the arid soil of metaphysics to the fertile field of a particular science.

ALMA R. THORNE.

Social Consciousness and its Object. E. S. AMES. Psych. Bul., VIII, 12, pp. 407-416.

Our social experience is the basic phase of all our experience. Within it are gradually discriminated selves and things, the social group and the ideal social self. Through the interplay of gesture and response, oral and written speech, the individual comes to consciousness of himself. The very objects of perception are nothing more than registrations of group habits and activities. Closely allied to the social character of the growth of individual consciousness is the development of a sense of the group on the part of the individual. This group sense is fostered by warfare for a common end, by coöperation, or by any other dominant interest. The character of a deity will represent some fundamental group interest. Polytheism is the natural accompaniment of a number of imperfectly coördinated social habits or selves of the group, while monotheism expresses a stage when the life interests are sufficiently unified to refer to one main activity.

J. R. TUTTLE.

Husserl (*Sa critique du Psychologisme et sa conception d'une Logique pure*).

V. DELBOS. Rev. de Mét., XIX, 5, pp. 685-698.

The explanation of knowledge may be either logical, *i. e.*, an exposition of the laws of an ideal procedure of thought; or psychological, *i. e.*, an exposition of the psychological fact of knowing in its empirical setting. The representatives of psychologism admit that there must be a doctrine of science in general which shall determine the universal forms of knowing and the meaning of the title of science in the abstract; but they contend that these definitions may be furnished by psychology. What they prove, however, is not the all-sufficiency of psychology, but the need of coöperation between psychology and logic. Logic can never be reduced to psychology, for psychology yields only inexact correlations of empirical facts, while logic demands exact concatenations of timeless truths. The failure of psychology to explain logical relations is evinced in its identification of logical inconsistency with the impossibility of psychological coexistence; its logical effect, in the subsequent appearance of scepticism as to the possibility of an absolute and independent truth. Psychologism confuses (1) the objective laws of pure logic and the accidents of human psychic existence; (2) that psychological aspect manifest in any science whatsoever, and the logical concatenation of things which is the essence of science; (3) the logical and psychological meanings of evidence in truth. Husserl's pure logic is not only a reaction against psychologism, but also a positive construction. Its content is (1) primitive concepts, such as conjunction, disjunction, and hypothesis; (2) categories, such as object and unity; (3) laws based on these categories, such as the laws of the syllogism and the pure theory of number. Pure logic investigates empirical science with the aim of discovering some inner essence in the presented course of phenomena. The obvious criticism of this procedure is that pure logic not only excludes psychology from logic, but psychology from psychology.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

L'Introspection. L. DUGAS. Rev. Ph., XXXVI, 12, pp. 606-626.

The present tendency on the part of some thinkers to deny the import of introspection as a method for psychology either wholly or in part, and to substitute for it the use of physical, physiological, or sociological tests, destroys the existence of psychology completely, as only in the act of introspection do we get the real primary mental fact; hence the question of the import of introspection as a scientific method, is really that of how psychology is possible as a science. This question of the *import* of introspection involves first a discussion of the *value* and that, in turn, of the *nature* of introspection. It has been claimed that the introspective method is contradictory in that it involves the return of the subject upon the object and the identity of the spectator and the actor. It seems that the subject-relation to the act in question does wrong to the act itself, hence some have thought to get rid of the trouble by appealing to retrospection rather than introspection; but the objection holds good here too, as appears in almost all Memoirs, for the subject

seems to exercise a selective memory as well as to color the present state by reason of his psychological purpose. And while we discuss the possibility of introspection, the introspective psychologist goes on and uses this method with satisfactory results; it would seem then that some men exist who are able to turn and consider their own inner states, and this without altering them by the act of examination. This ability seems to be a native quality but yet is capable of increase through practice and of acquiring a knowledge of its limitations; hence it tries to correct its procedure by an appeal to the external object. But it need not so appeal, for in retrospection we have the real test of the validity of our introspections, the test of *experience*. Rigorous introspection does not need the help of external objects nor of the experience of other minds; it is self-sufficient. What then can we say about the *general import* of the result of introspective psychology? Introspection, then, has a scientific value and this because the psychological facts manifest themselves to a greater or less degree in each individual. Those, then, who attack the introspective point of view, are attacking psychology itself; for introspection is the stand-point of psychology proper and is also a valid and useful help in any other mental science, which must inevitably have at its base a psychological problem.

F. R. PROUT.

Vie animale et vie morale. ANDRÉ LALANDE. Rev. Ph., XXXVI, 11, pp. 523-528.

By comparing moral life with animal life, we see how our human nature differs from our animal nature. The will-to-live belongs particularly to the latter and signifies the effort not to be overcome by the *milieu*, the desire to maintain the characteristic type of race or species, and to preserve individual differences. On the other hand, the moral life expresses the alteration of the type, the destruction of individual or of collective differences, to the profit of a more general type or of a common thought. In every man there are two men, each rejoicing at the failings of the other, and exhibiting the eternal struggle of the spirit against the flesh and the flesh against the spirit.

ALMA R. THORNE.

Schopenhauer's Contact with Theology. WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER. Harvard Theol. Rev., IV, 3, pp. 271-310.

For Schopenhauer, consciousness is a guide to action in attainment of desire. Will is the wish to be freed from pain. Satisfaction, always momentary, is the beginning either of another desire or emptiness. Some desires become passions and make brutes of us. Pain is the reality of living. Time hastens pleasure into its opposite or boredom. Yet pain slackens time and seems utterly abnormal. We never question pleasure. Even the most high of life have their wants checked, and this is the common lot. Society is a war of egoistic interests with methods of cunning and force. Our world makes a very good comparison with Hell as the worst of possible worlds in

times when human demons sacrifice thousands of lives under the pretext of a pious delusion. Yet ours is not the worst possible world. It is merely the worst possible world that could exist. In amusement and non-predatory pursuits deceit, of self and others, gives us the greatest joy and apparent well being. The idea of progress is an occidental illusion. They should try to produce the most perfect types existing. There is no hope for a higher type. The idea of a fall seemed to Schopenhauer a moral and metaphysical necessity. Back of the world of suffering there is eternal righteousness. We blindly choose our present mode of life, guilt and misery are identical. He who injures another bites into his own flesh. Sin is really contrary to us. Although we cannot understand freedom, we can see its place and necessity. Then, too, ethics is impossible without responsibility. Since will is cause of life we cannot end it by merely ending life. The craving for individual life is the cause of all pain. Disinterested life overcomes this. The escapes from the will to live lie through Philosophy and Art and Saintliness. Schopenhauer has Nirvana in mind when he speaks of Nihilism as the goal.

MATTHEW W. PAXTON.